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You are here: Home / Articles / Understanding FMEA Causes – Part 1

by Carl S. Carlson Leave a Comment

Understanding FMEA Causes – Part 1

Understanding FMEA Causes – Part 1

Getting to the Root of the Matter

Does a cause description need to be a design or manufacturing deficiency? Why? This is one of the more important questions to consider if you want to achieve quality FMEAs.

“The effort to get at the truth has to precede all other efforts.”
Albert Einstein

Definition of “Cause”

The Oxford English dictionary defines “cause ” as “a thing that gives rise to an action, phenomenon or condition.”

What is the definition of “Cause” in an FMEA?

A “cause” is the specific reason for the failure, preferably found by asking “why” until the root cause is determined. For Design FMEAs, the cause is the design deficiency that results in the failure mode. For Process FMEAs, the cause is the manufacturing or assembly deficiency (or source of variation) that results in the failure mode.

How are Causes identified in FMEAs?

The FMEA team considers each failure mode, and determines the underlying reason for the failure mode. There can be one or more causes, and the team should identify as many causes as are needed to document their concerns. Causes should be described in sufficient detail to establish the underlying reasons for the cause, often called the “root” cause. The only exception to this is for higher levels of analysis, such as System FMEAs, in which the cause may remain at a higher level, such as a component failure, and not carried all the way down to the reason for the component failure. For high-risk issues, the FMEA team can recommend a lower-level FMEA to drill down to root cause. It is vital to understand the primary reasons for the failure. It is often useful to use the phrase “due to” to help get the root cause. For example, in the case of the projector lamp shattering, a possible cause could be “over pressure due to wrong gas.”

In Design FMEAs, root causes are often described in terms of product characteristics, such as dimensions, weight, orientation, hardness, strength, etc. The design deficiency relates to the product characteristic, such as “material too soft.” In Process FMEAs, root causes are often described in terms of process characteristics, such as oven temperature, tool wear, part position, weld-device current, pressure, flow rate, etc. The manufacturing deficiency relates to the process characteristic, such as “insufficient or intermittent weld-device current.”

What is an example of a Design FMEA cause?

Item: Power steering pump

Function: Delivers hydraulic power for steering by transforming oil pressure at inlet (xx psi) into higher oil pressure at outlet ([yy] psi) during engine idle speed

Failure Mode: Inadequate outlet pressure (less than [yy] psi)

Effect (Local: Pump): Low pressure fluid goes to steering gear
Effect (Next level: Steering Subsystem): Increased friction at steering gear
Effect (End user): Increased steering effort with potential accident during steering maneuvers

Cause: Fluid incorrectly specified (viscosity too low)

Poorly worded example of Cause: Outlet pressure too low

What is an example of a Process FMEA cause?

Process Step: Induction harden shafts using induction hardening machine

Function: Induction harden shafts using induction-hardening machine ABC, with minimum hardness Brinell Hardness Number (BHN) “X”, according to specification #123.

Failure Mode: Shaft hardness less than BHN “X”

Effect (In plant): 100% scrap
Effect (End user): Potential shaft fracture with complete loss of performance

Cause: Induction machine electrical voltage/current settings incorrect for part number

Poorly worded example of Cause: Operator error

Application Tip

It is impossible to overstress the importance of fully analyzing and understanding the cause. A half-analyzed cause has little value, as the cause is the heart and soul of the FMEA. Take the example of a projector lamp shattering. If the FMEA team simply describes the cause as “over pressure” and does not ask why the over pressure, the root cause of “wrong gas” is not established. The team will end up trying to solve “over pressure,” and may miss recommending the correct gas specification. The problem will not be solved. It is often useful to use the phrase “due to” to help get the root cause. For example, in the case of the projector lamp shattering, a possible cause could be “over pressure due to wrong gas.”

Many practitioners use repeated questioning of the FMEA team to ensure that the basic “why” is determined as the cause of a failure mode. This technique, called the Five Whys, can be very helpful, especially when the root cause is not forthcoming. The Five Whys is a technique developed by Taiichi Ohno, originator of the Toyota Production System. It means that by asking “why” five times, the team will be able to discover the progression of cause-and-effect relationships behind a problem and the root cause that is below the surface.

Next Article

The next article presents beginner, intermediate and advanced problems relating to FMEA causes, along with solutions. One of the problems poses a realistic and especially challenging circumstance that FMEA teams can experience.

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Filed Under: Articles, Inside FMEA, on Tools & Techniques

About Carl S. Carlson

Carl S. Carlson is a consultant and instructor in the areas of FMEA, reliability program planning and other reliability engineering disciplines, supporting over one hundred clients from a wide cross-section of industries. He has 35 years of experience in reliability testing, engineering, and management positions, including senior consultant with ReliaSoft Corporation, and senior manager for the Advanced Reliability Group at General Motors.

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Articles by Carl Carlson
in the Inside FMEA series

[popup type="" link_text="Logo Info" ]

Information about FMEA Icon

Inside FMEA can be visually represented by a large tree, with roots, a solid trunk, branches, and leaves.

- The roots of the tree represent the philosophy and guiding principles for effective FMEAs.
- The solid trunk of the tree represents the fundamentals for all FMEAs.
- The branches represent the various FMEA applications.
- The leaves represent the valuable outcomes of FMEAs.
- This is intended to convey that each of the various FMEA applications have the same fundamentals and philosophical roots.

 

For example, the roots of the tree can represent following philosophy and guiding principles for effective FMEAs, such as:

1. Correct procedure         2. Lessons learned
3. Trained team                 4. Focus on prevention
5. Integrated with DFR    6. Skilled facilitation
7. Management support

The tree trunk represents the fundamentals of FMEA. All types of FMEA share common fundamentals, and these are essential to successful FMEA applications.

The tree branches can include the different types of FMEAs, including:

1. System FMEA         2. Design FMEA
3. Process FMEA        4. DRBFM
5. Hazard Analysis     6. RCM or Maintenance FMEA
7. Software FMEA      8. Other types of FMEA

The leaves of the tree branches represent individual FMEA projects, with a wide variety of FMEA scopes and results. [/popup]

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