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You are here: Home / Articles / The Philosophy of Effective FMEAs – Part 2

by Carl S. Carlson 2 Comments

The Philosophy of Effective FMEAs – Part 2

The Philosophy of Effective FMEAs – Part 2

Stand Like a Rock
(Problems and Solutions)

What did American inventor and businessman Charles Kettering  mean when he said, “A problem well stated is a problem half-solved”? Framing the problem and pondering solutions can be enlightening, and a great way to learn. This article will pose three problems and offer solutions, as a way to learn by doing.

“I hear and I forget. I see and I remember. I do and I understand.”
Confucius

Beginner’s Problem

Which of the following statements is true about why FMEAs need to be supported by well-understood and communicated principles? (Select all that apply.)

  1. The entire FMEA process needs to be driven by correct philosophy, meaning that the approach is based on proven principles that support achieving high safety and reliability.
  2. The essence of “guiding principles” is the specific procedure that the FMEA team follows once the FMEA has begun.
  3. If one’s approach to doing FMEAs is based on incorrect objectives or wrong principles, then the results will be less than desired.
  4. Having the right philosophical approach to doing FMEAs applies to System and Design FMEAs, but not to Process FMEAs.

  1. The entire FMEA process needs to be driven by correct philosophy, meaning that the approach is based on proven principles that support achieving high safety and reliability. (True)
  2. The essence of “guiding principles” is the specific procedure that the FMEA team follows once the FMEA has begun. (False. The FMEA guiding principles are the foundation for excellent FMEAs. The procedures are the detailed steps of how to implement FMEAs.)
  3. If one’s approach to doing FMEAs is based on incorrect objectives or wrong principles, then the results will be less than desired. (True)
  4. Having the right philosophical approach to doing FMEAs applies to System and Design FMEAs, but not to Process FMEAs. (False. Having the right philosophical approach to doing FMEAs applies to all types of FMEAs.)

Intermediate Problem

Study the following FMEA excerpt for a projector lamp:

[click to enlarge]

Figure 1

Which of the four recommended actions in this excerpt are supportive of a philosophy that focuses on prevention? Why?

The first three recommended actions are prevention-type actions. The plastic shield is intended to prevent injury. The modification to Design Guide #ABC is intended to improve the capability of the design guide to prevent future problems with projector design. The projector gas DOE is intended to improve the selection of bulb gas to de-sensitize the gas bulb pressure to variation in gas characteristics. The last recommended action, the modification of lamp durability test #456, improves the test capability, and is not focused on prevention.

Advanced Problem

You are asked to lead an FMEA team to perform a Design FMEA on the new bicycle braking subsystem. You understand that FMEAs are a team-based activity, and have identified a cross-functional team of 6 people. The proper preparation tasks are completed and you schedule the first team meeting. Only one person shows up, in addition to yourself. What should you do and why?

As covered in this article, FMEA is a team-based activity. There are many reasons that FMEAs need to be performed by the right team of subject matter experts. Here are three such reasons.

  1. People have “blind spots.” A well-defined cross-functional team minimizes the errors inherent with “blind spots.”
  2. The FMEA analysis requires subject-matter experts from a variety of disciplines to ensure incorporation of all necessary inputs into the exercise, and that the proper expertise is applied to the design or process being analyzed.
  3. One of the indispensable values of an FMEA is the cross talk and synergy between subject-matter experts that occurs during the meetings. Well-defined groups can discover things that individuals often miss.

I would not suggest going forward with an FMEA meeting when the primary team members do not show up. There may be some tasks that can be supported by one or two people, such as improving the FMEA Block Diagram, or identifying candidate functions from the product technical specifications. However, the procedure of FMEA should be done with the team present in the room, being led by a skilled facilitator. Before the next FMEA meeting, management should be consulted to obtain their support in getting full attendance at future FMEA meetings.

Next article

What are the most important factors for success in FMEA applications? This topic will be explored in the next article titled “FMEA Success Factors.”

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Filed Under: Articles, Inside FMEA, on Tools & Techniques

About Carl S. Carlson

Carl S. Carlson is a consultant and instructor in the areas of FMEA, reliability program planning and other reliability engineering disciplines, supporting over one hundred clients from a wide cross-section of industries. He has 35 years of experience in reliability testing, engineering, and management positions, including senior consultant with ReliaSoft Corporation, and senior manager for the Advanced Reliability Group at General Motors.

« The Philosophy of Effective FMEAs – Part 1
Knowledge Based Decisions »

Comments

  1. Roopesh says

    August 6, 2017 at 11:35 PM

    Hi Carl,
    For FEME design change is applicable?
    If design is changed after initial RPN calculation then can we change severity level in second step?

    Regards,

    Roopesh

    Reply
    • Carl Carlson says

      August 7, 2017 at 5:35 AM

      Hi Roopesh,
      If by “second step” you mean the final RPN calculation, the answer is a qualified “yes.” If the FMEA team believes the design change has changed the severity of the effect for a given failure mode, they can enter the modified severity rating in the FMEA worksheet. In this case, the design change should be reflected in the FMEA “recommended actions” and “actions taken” columns, and the modified severity rating should be entered in the “severity revised” and corresponding “RPN revised” columns.
      Please let me know if this answers your question.
      Thanks.
      Carl

      Reply

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Articles by Carl Carlson
in the Inside FMEA series

[popup type="" link_text="Logo Info" ]

Information about FMEA Icon

Inside FMEA can be visually represented by a large tree, with roots, a solid trunk, branches, and leaves.

- The roots of the tree represent the philosophy and guiding principles for effective FMEAs.
- The solid trunk of the tree represents the fundamentals for all FMEAs.
- The branches represent the various FMEA applications.
- The leaves represent the valuable outcomes of FMEAs.
- This is intended to convey that each of the various FMEA applications have the same fundamentals and philosophical roots.

 

For example, the roots of the tree can represent following philosophy and guiding principles for effective FMEAs, such as:

1. Correct procedure         2. Lessons learned
3. Trained team                 4. Focus on prevention
5. Integrated with DFR    6. Skilled facilitation
7. Management support

The tree trunk represents the fundamentals of FMEA. All types of FMEA share common fundamentals, and these are essential to successful FMEA applications.

The tree branches can include the different types of FMEAs, including:

1. System FMEA         2. Design FMEA
3. Process FMEA        4. DRBFM
5. Hazard Analysis     6. RCM or Maintenance FMEA
7. Software FMEA      8. Other types of FMEA

The leaves of the tree branches represent individual FMEA projects, with a wide variety of FMEA scopes and results. [/popup]

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